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Abstract
Background: While healthcare systems vary in their structure and available resources, it is widely recognized that
medical doctors play a key role in their adaptation and performance. In this article, we examine recent government
and organizational policies in two different health systems that aim to develop clinical leadership among the
medical profession. Clinical leadership refers to the engagement and guiding role of physicians in health system
improvement. Three dimensions are defined to conduct our analysis of engaging medical doctors in healthcare
leadership: the position and status of medical doctors within the system; the broader institutional context of
governmental and organizational policies to engage medical doctors in clinical leadership roles; and the main
factors that may facilitate or limit achievements.
Methods: Our aim in this study is exploratory. We selected two contrasting cases according to their level of
institutional pluralism: one national health insurance system, Canada, and one etatist social insurance system, the
Netherlands. We documented the institutional dynamics of medical doctors’ engagement and leadership through
secondary sources, such as government websites, key policy reports, and scholarly literature on health policies in
both countries.
Results: Initiatives across Canadian provinces signal that the medical profession and governments search for
alternatives to involve doctors in health system improvement beyond the limitations imposed by their fundamental
social contract and formal labour relations. These initiatives suggest an emerging trend toward more joint
collaboration between governments and medical associations. In the Dutch system, organizational and legal
attempts for integration over the past decades do not yet fit well with the ideas and interests of medical doctors.
The engagement of medical doctors requires additional initiatives that are closer to their professional values and
interests and that depart from an overly focus on top down performance indicators and competition.
Conclusions: Different institutional contexts have different policy experiences regarding the engagement and
leadership of medical doctors but seem to face similar policy challenges. Achieving alignment between soft (trust,
collaboration) and hard (financial incentives) levers may require facilitative conditions at the level of the health
system, like clarity and stability of broad policy orientations and openness to local experimentation.
Keywords: Medical engagement, Clinical leadership, Health system improvement
Background
While healthcare systems vary in their structure and avail-
able resources, it is widely recognized that medical doctors
play a key role in the adaptation and performance of these
systems [1, 2]. Physicians have a unique influence on the
utilization of healthcare resources by prescribing treat-
ments and drugs. They can play various formal and
informal roles that help creating a rich environment for
improved practices and ultimately increase the perform-
ance of healthcare organizations [3, 4]. Studies on health
system performance and clinical governance emphasize
the importance of strong clinical leadership to drive im-
provement efforts and initiatives [5, 6]. Hospital perform-
ance is increasingly associated with medical specialists
taking up tasks beyond direct patient care and develop
their co-operation with executive boards [7, 8]. Leadership
and engagement of other professionals are also crucial for
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health system improvement; yet, the unique status and in-
fluence of the medical profession may require a specific
focus of attention.
In this article, we examine recent government and
organizational policies that aim to develop, implement,
sustain and scale-up clinical leadership among the med-
ical profession. Clinical leadership refers to the engage-
ment and guiding role of physicians in health system
improvement. This role goes further than their involve-
ment in formal leadership positions. It refers to an active
role of doctors in activities for healthcare improvement
that goes beyond their immediate clinical duties and re-
sponsibilities in delivering care to patients [9]. Spurgeon
and colleagues (2008) suggested that these activities can
include the participation of doctors in managing risks
and quality; the evaluation of programs or technologies
at organizational or system levels; the involvement in
strategic committees that influence the development of
the organization; or the involvement of physicians in ex-
ecutive roles [10].
Those roles and expectations regarding professionals
and more specifically medical doctors have been desig-
nated as “professional-managerial hybrids” or clinical
leaders [11, 12]. Clinical leadership thus incorporates a
variety of roles and resources that help front-lines clini-
cians to introduce new ways of working and to redesign
care for improvements [4]. It is expected that clinical
leaders will influence their peers through their profes-
sional knowledge and skills in promoting improvement
of care within the context of available resources. They
will also collaborate with managers in developing
organizational strategies that are aligned with quality im-
provement [13].
While studies have shown benefits in the development of
clinical leadership where clinical expertise is combined with
other capacities; the materialisation and broad-scale diffu-
sion of clinical leadership for improvement within health-
care systems is not without challenges [2, 12]. Professional
power may resist attempts by clinical leaders to reframe the
context of work and the relationships between organiza-
tions and professions. The position of a professional elite
that gains power and control over their peers in exchange
of the protection of professional autonomy - the restratifi-
cation thesis of Friedson (1984) - may be contested [14, 15].
Because of those potential challenges, governments and
organizational policies search for strategies to mobilise a
broader professional base to improve care such as collab-
orative quality improvement initiatives [16]. A large-scale
development of clinical leaders for improvement within
healthcare systems needs the support of institutional condi-
tions, such as career perspectives and the development of
skills and capacities to engage in mediating roles between
organizations and the professions [11, 17]. Studies of orga-
nized professionalism and hybrid roles [13, 18] have
suggested the importance of institutional factors that pro-
mote or impede the emergence of such leadership roles.
Studies of medical doctors in management have focused on
the incorporation of new logics or imperatives in clinical
practices (for example accounting in medicine in Finland
[19]), impact of quasi-market in NHS-England on the
emergence of medical-managers roles [20], and more re-
cently, forms of identities in hybrid roles among medical
managers [12]. While these works are very informative on
the emergence and characteristics of hybrid roles among
the medical professions, they do not take a system-wide
context and health policy perspective on the strategies used
to engage medical doctors in hybrid roles and more broadly
in improvement efforts. In this paper we look at recent de-
velopments in the institutional context of medical doctors
in two very distinct healthcare systems. Our empirical ana-
lysis is focused on how government and organizational pol-
icies may (or may not) drive and shape the emergence of
clinical leaders for improvement.
The paper is structured as follows. We first review lit-
erature on the challenges in engaging medical doctors in
system and organizational leadership roles. Then we in-
vestigate how two different healthcare systems shape or
limit the opportunities for physician engagement and
leadership. We use the illustrative cases of Canada and
the Netherlands to analyze recent experiences of medical
doctors’ leadership and engagement. Based on key stud-
ies in the field, we discuss strategies to better engage
medical doctors and develop their leadership for health
system improvement.
Challenges in reconciling professional and
organizational logics in healthcare
Professions have incarnated an idealized form of expert-
ise in contemporary societies, with an ability to skillfully
apply complex knowledge to the resolution of problems.
The medical profession still represents an ideal-typical
form of profession where competent individuals provide
highly valued services in unselfish devotion [20] and
where professional autonomy is exercised in the context
of accountability to patients and peers [21]. Sociological
studies of the medical profession have emphasized the
professionals’ capacity to preserve monopoly over spe-
cialized knowledge and to create boundaries that protect
the status and roles of doctors in society [22, 23].
Initiatives that aim at involving medical doctors in roles
that go beyond the delivery of clinical services will necessar-
ily imply a combination of their professional expertise with
other forms of knowledge, and the application of this ex-
pertise to more collective problems and issues [9]. This is
also recognized in the notion of “organized professional-
ism” where medical practice is perceived as increasingly
embedded in a broader organizational context, due to a set
of political, economic and social forces and contingencies
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that challenges the traditional representation of professional
work and independence [13].
Several studies have focused on the theme of the inte-
gration and alignment of the medical profession within
US healthcare organizations [24–26]. These researchers
examined organizational models and strategies that pro-
mote a stronger connection between the medical profes-
sion and healthcare organizations and systems through
various structural and incentives arrangements. One of
the key insights gained from these works is that struc-
tural and economic integration of medical doctors
within organizations are not sufficient to enable genuine
engagement and leadership for improvement.
Other studies have paid attention to the accommodation
of the managerial and professional logic in knowledge-
based and professional organizations [27]. Medical doctors
and other healthcare professionals face increasing pres-
sures to work within organizations and to become more
involved in formal organizational settings [28, 29]. Evi-
dence regarding the impact of organizational context on
the professional status and practices [27, 30, 31] indicates
however that the medical profession has adapted quite
well to practice in more formal organizational contexts.
Such adaptation can reflect a new balance between profes-
sional norms and organizational demand for accountabil-
ity while revealing at the same time the ability of some
professions to operate a kind of organizational closure
[32] or to restructure their work in favour of more collab-
orative forms of work to simultaneously achieve profes-
sional and organizational goals [30].
Although a process of accommodation between the
medical profession and organizations has been observed
in these studies, they do not provide much insight into
how to convert such accommodation into resources for
professional renewal and health system improvement.
Analysis by Waring [15], Schott & al. [18] and Muzio et
al. [32] suggest that the roles of professionals and their
autonomy are in a constant flux where various forms of
professionalism - occupational, organizational, hybrid -
interact to create a kind of situated professionalism,
influenced by broader changes in the institutional con-
text. These studies stay relatively silent on how increased
social demands for more accountable professions influ-
ence the development, transformation and use of clinical
capacities for leadership. More specifically, we lack
knowledge on how contingencies at the level of (health-
care) systems and organizations induce a reframing of
professional engagement and clinical leadership. At-
tempts to incorporate physicians into organizational
structures are common now, but appear insufficient by
itself for engaging doctors in the redesign and regulation
of health care systems [4]. The political context and gov-
ernment policies, in particular policy capacity and coher-
ence [33], can also influence the propensity of doctors to
engage in healthcare improvement and in new regulatory
roles and functions.
The transition of (some) medical doctors to leadership
positions in healthcare organizations and systems is thus
associated with several conceptual and empirical chal-
lenges. One challenging issue is about the capacity of
professionals to invest in more collective levels of appli-
cation of professional knowledge and expertise while
maintaining their specificity and identity in more collect-
ive and distributed forms of leadership [34]. Specifically,
the perceived needs for increased regulation to produce
high quality and safety of care [35] may support the
emergence of a new professional elite [14, 15] and a new
science of healthcare improvement that may contradict
with the broader movement of engaging physicians and
other front-line professionals in large-scale improvement
[36]. Also, the development of new regulatory tools for
making clinical work more manageable and visible will
necessarily impact on the relationships of medical
doctors with their work context and practice settings [2].
Based on our literature review, we clearly reveal three
dimensions that are related to the theme of engaging
medical doctors in healthcare leadership: the position
and status of medical doctors within the system; the
broader institutional context of governmental and
organizational policies to engage medical doctors in clin-
ical leadership roles; and the main factors that may fa-
cilitate or limit achievements. We will analyze these
three dimensions in the public healthcare systems of
Canada and the Netherlands, and evaluate recent initia-
tives to engage medical doctors and develop their leader-
ship for health system improvement. In the next section,
we first explain our methodology.
Methodology
Our aim in this study is exploratory and based on the
assumption that the broader institutional context of gov-
ernment an organizational policies influences the pro-
pensity of medical doctors to move beyond their
traditional role as the patient’s agent to develop clinical
leadership. We selected two cases for the current study
with different institutional characteristics: the Canadian
and the Dutch healthcare systems. These systems repre-
sent two contrasting cases [37] regarding the influence
of broad institutional and health system context on the
development of clinical leadership for improvement. The
two countries have been categorized in a recent health
system typology as a National health insurance system
(Canada) and an etatist social health insurance system
(the Netherlands) [38].
The two cases vary on key organizing dimensions: fi-
nancing for Canada is through fiscal resources, regula-
tion is operated by the State and the system relies on
private or not-for-profit providers that are covered by
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public money for medical and hospitals services. In the
Dutch case, regulation is also operated by the State, but
the role of private providers (like insurers companies) in
the governance and finance of healthcare has been sig-
nificantly increased since the reform in 2006. A key fea-
ture of the Canadian healthcare system is the strong
autonomy of the medical profession with a focus on ne-
gotiating provision and compensation directly between
the State (provinces) and medical associations [39]. In
the Dutch case, the system is much more diverse, and
leaves more space for various arrangements or levels of
integration between the medical profession and delivery
organizations. The Dutch system is by its pluralistic na-
ture, as compared to Canada, apparently less centralized,
with probably more space for organizational-professional
initiatives than the Canadian one.
Based on the work of Tuohy [40] on hybridization
process in mature healthcare systems we argue that
some systems leave more space for professional entre-
preneurship and are more receptive for reforms to im-
prove and adapt the healthcare system (for example the
Netherlands), while some other systems will be more
characterized by inertia (e.g. Canada) [39]. Consequently,
systems may offer more or less opportunities for the in-
volvement of doctors in clinical leadership at both the
organizational and system levels, for example in
professional-managerial hybrid roles [12] or in broader
improvement process such as collaborative quality im-
provement. Aligned with the exploratory scope of this
article, we have documented the institutional dynamics
of medical doctors’ engagement and leadership in both
jurisdictions through secondary sources, such as web-
sites of governments in each jurisdiction, identification
of key policy reports, and scholarly literature on health
policies in both countries.
Transforming the role of the medical profession:
the Canadian case
In Canada, provinces and territories are responsible for
the management, organization and to a large part for the
financing of their healthcare system. Each province and
territory develops its healthcare system within the
broader context of the Canada Health Act (CHA or the
Act, adopted in 1984). The Act is Canada’s federal legis-
lation for publicly funded health care insurance and sets
out the primary objective of Canadian health care policy
[41]. Overall, the costs of the healthcare system in
Canada are estimated at 11.2 % as a share of GDP for an
average of 9.3 % for OECD countries [42]. Cost is con-
sidered an important policy issue while for provinces the
cost of healthcare represents more than 42 % of the ex-
penditure in public programs. The Commonwealth Fund
ranks the Canadian healthcare system poorly to some di-
mensions of quality, patient experience and access [43].
Pressures are important to improve the functioning of
these systems and the care that is delivered.
The position of medical doctors in Canada
The basic social contract of Canadian medicine is one of
autonomy, professional entrepreneurship and arms-length
relationships with health systems and governments. At the
time of the creation of the public healthcare systems in
various provinces, it was agreed that physicians would not
be considered as employees of public healthcare organiza-
tions. They mostly maintained a capacity to operate as au-
tonomous agents in the system, paid by an independent
public agency or third-party payer [39]. Physician unions
(Quebec) or professional associations negotiate directly
their status and practice conditions through labour agree-
ments with provincial and territorial governments. Con-
cretely, medical doctors obtained the privileged right to
practice in hospitals/public healthcare organizations,
through the boards of healthcare organizations and local
medical councils, and medical doctors are more or less
regulated by their peers through various organizational ar-
rangements and professional colleges depending on the
provinces or territories.
This type of social contract between the medical pro-
fession and the health care systems and more largely
with the society, has been overall very beneficial for the
profession. They still benefit from a lot of autonomy in
regard of their location of practice and development of
their professional career; they have a very high social sta-
tus, and they are very well paid. The income of physi-
cians relative to average wage in Canada is estimated at
4.7 for specialists and 3.1 for generalists [43]. Recent sta-
tistics from OECD (2014) shows that medical workforce
has grown since 2000 but the number of physicians in
Canada (2.5 doctors per 1000 population) still remained
below the OECD average of 3.2 [44]. The growing num-
ber of physicians may put more pressures on costs and
consequently push governments in a better position to
develop initiatives to better engage medical doctors in
health systems improvement.
Overall, recent analysis [39] suggests that one of the
key obstacles to reform healthcare in Canada is related
to the ability of the medical profession as an organized
body to defend their interests and resist changes that are
perceived against these interests. Those authors used the
term “paradigm freeze” to qualify the inertia within the
Canadian healthcare system that emanated, at least
partly, from the fundamental social contract between the
medical profession and the state that somewhat
consecrated a situation of arms-length relationship be-
tween doctors and governments. We will now look at
strategies that aim at transcending these structural limi-
tations in order to better involve medical doctors in
broad system improvement.
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Initiatives to engage medical doctors in leadership for
healthcare improvements
Within the broader context just described, there are
emerging initiatives across Canada to better engage
medical doctors and develop their leadership for health
system improvement. We will describe here some of
these initiatives in various provinces and assess how they
depart from a more regulatory approach and support the
development of the commitment of the profession for
broader health system goals [45]. The purpose of this
case description is not to provide an exhaustive account
but to briefly account for illustrative purposes of some
trends that are informative on how clinical leadership of
medical doctors develop within and depart from the
situation of “paradigm freeze” as we described earlier.
Our analysis of these initiatives reveals two emerging
trends in the Canadian health policy scene with regards
to doctors and the healthcare system: the emergence of
collaborative work for improvement between the med-
ical profession and governments and a growing emphasis
on accountability relations and performance manage-
ment in shaping the relation between the profession and
public authorities. Those trends are not mutually exclu-
sive, they can compete for legitimacy which may create
tensions in the relation between medical doctors and
government. We will now describe some initiatives in
different provinces to illustrate the dynamic that sur-
rounded efforts to develop clinical leadership for health
system improvement among the medical profession.
In British Columbia, the third larger province in Canada,
the Shared Care Committee is created in 2006 [46]. The
committee is a joint initiative between the British Columbia
Medical Association (BCMA) and the British Columbia
Ministry of Health. The purpose of the committee is to
support initiatives among the medical profession to im-
prove care in the system. Government funding is provided
to support such initiatives For example, in 2013, $8 million
has been provided to support 21 medical-led initiatives
through the SCC. These initiatives appear to be based on
two principles: they leave a lot of flexibility to local and re-
gional initiatives in the design of the different projects and
they are essentially collaborative where the professions and
more specifically the medical profession is a key driving
force.
These initiatives can be considered as a political trend
toward the adoption of a less adversarial approach in the
relation between the medical approach and government
[47]. It also suggests that a medical leadership for im-
provement agenda becomes integrated within the discus-
sions between the state and the medical association and
consequently broaden the negotiation space beyond the
working conditions of professionals.
Saskatchewan, a province from central Canada, provides
illustration of a different approach with the launch in 2008
of a large-scale improvement program - the Accelerating
Excellence program [48] - to develop quality improvement
initiatives and capacities across their healthcare system.
This program is strongly driven by the central government
and the diffusion of the Lean approach has been privileged
as the main driver of improvement: “Saskatchewan is the
first jurisdiction in Canada to apply Lean processes across
its entire health system. More than 1000 Lean projects have
been launched in Saskatchewan health regions and within
the Ministry of Health and Saskatchewan Cancer Agency”
(http://www.saskatchewan.ca/government/health-care-ad-
ministration-and-provider-resources/saskatchewan-health-
initiatives/lean). It is within this broader provincial effort to
improve the system that medical association and profes-
sional college in collaboration with the government the
Champions for Quality Improvement initiative to support
the adhesion of doctors to the Accelerating Excellence
program [47]. Policy trends in favour of health system im-
provement provide opportunities for the development of
clinical leadership among the medical professions. The
level at which the involvement of doctors in the imple-
mentation of the quality agenda will culminate in a large-
scale development of medical leadership for improvement
still an open question. As in British-Columbia, policy-
makers and professional association have agreed that to
involve medical doctors beyond their immediate clinical
duties specific strategies need to be developed taking into
account their singular position and status in the system.
One of the driving forces across Canada behind a
greater co-optation of the medical profession in improve-
ment initiatives are pressures from governments for in-
creased accountability and performance. For example,
Ontario, the largest province in Canada, has promulgated
the Excellent Care for All Act in 2010. A set of initiatives
have cascaded down from this act including new funding
and incentive mechanisms and approaches that place dis-
tinct emphasis on quality and on the role of medical doc-
tors in achieving improvements in healthcare [47]. In
addition, the Act introduced Health Quality Ontario, an
agency responsible for the provincial emphasis on quality.
Medical compensation has also been increasingly tied to
evidence based recommendations and performance tar-
gets, with a major emphasis on primary care [49]. Ontario,
somewhat similar to the situation in Saskatchewan, illus-
trates a situation where a strong policy-drive from the
provincial government set up a new context to approach
the role of medical doctors in improvement. An important
role is attributed here to the management of performance
and to the use of incentives to stimulate involvement in
quality improvement.
Quebec, the second largest province of Canada, has
promoted the engagement and the leadership of medical
doctors for health system improvement through time
with various structural arrangements like the creation of
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medical advisory or planning bodies at the central govern-
ment and regional levels and various executive positions
for medical doctors within the health care system. A
current healthcare reform combined elements of massive
restructuring across the system (effective April 1, 2015),
budget rationalization and a new policy to set productivity
targets for primary care physicians. Medical doctors’
union engaged in intense negotiations with the govern-
ment to postpone the application of the new bill in ex-
change of a guarantee to meet productivity targets [50].
These major policy initiatives reflect the importance
played by the regime of labour relations and the social
contract between the medical profession and the State in
shaping the involvement of doctors in improvement ini-
tiatives. Development of clinical leadership for improve-
ment among medical doctors is also strongly influenced
by the broader context of “big-bang” reform in the
Quebec healthcare system. Compare to the three others
provinces, the implementation of large-scale restructur-
ing may have left less space for the development of col-
laborative work for improvement between medical
doctors and the government. While in all provinces the
institutional arrangements associated with the labour ne-
gotiation regimes influence the framing of expectations
and the roles taken by the medical profession in im-
provement initiatives, the history of broad structural re-
forms in Quebec suggests that it has somewhat made
more challenging to develop a more collaborative policy
agenda.
Facilitative and limiting factors within the Canadian cases
These initiatives across Canadian provinces signal that the
medical profession and/or governments search for alterna-
tives to involve doctors in improvement initiatives beyond
the limitations imposed by their fundamental social
contract and formal labour relations regimes. While the ex-
amples we discussed kept the attributes of a top-down pol-
icy process (Quebec, and to a lesser degree Saskatchewan
and Ontario); the shared objective of improving patient care
and the pressures for increased performance and account-
ability seems to favour the development of a more collab-
orative approach around specific policy initiatives. Joint
improvement work and more affirmative performance
management can be a way to transcend a situation of “para-
digm freeze” that have characterized healthcare reforms in
Canada [39].
One may retain from our analysis of the Canadian
cases that the ability to engage the medical profession in
large-scale improvement cannot be understood without
paying attention to the broader health system policies
and governance context. Strategies to engage doctors
are, at least partly, conditioned by the labour regime and
by the policy-drive of governments to support large-
scale improvement. Collaborative work between medical
doctors and the state is still an emerging phenomenon.
It is too early to assess the implications of these policies
and initiatives for the evolution of medical professional-
ism including for the constitution of a new medical elite
that will carry on the improvement agenda. In addition,
the capacities of medical doctors involved in improve-
ment work to impose themselves or to mobilise rank
and file doctors at a sufficiently large-scale are still an
open question. It is also too early to assess the perform-
ance agenda within the regulation of the medical profes-
sion and its influence on their behaviors as providers of
care.
Engaging medical doctors in healthcare
leadership: the Dutch case
In the Netherlands, the national government is respon-
sible for regulating the healthcare system and setting
main strategic priorities. Hospitals and primary health-
care services develop their management and care activ-
ities within the context of the Dutch Health Insurance
Law (the ‘Zorgverzekeringswet’, Zvw), introduced on 1
January 2006. The Health Insurance Law is a mandatory
‘basic insurance’ that covers common medical care and
medicines. For long-term nursing and care, there is an-
other statutory form of insurance, the Long-term Care
Act (‘Wet Langdurige Zorg’, WLZ), introduced on 1
January 2015. Dutch residents are automatically insured
by the government for WLZ, but have to choose and pay
individually for their basic healthcare insurance. Health in-
surers have to offer a universal package for everyone, re-
gardless of age or health conditions, but may compete for
price. Contrary to many other European systems, the
Dutch government is responsible for the accessibility,
quality and ultimate costs of the healthcare system, but
not in charge of its management [8]. Private health in-
surers have a pivotal role since the Health Insurance Law
in a system of managed competition. Although private
(mainly not-for-profit) organizations play a main role in
executing the Dutch healthcare system, 85 – 90 % of the
health care sector is collectively financed through compul-
sory contributions and taxes.
Overall costs of the healthcare system in the
Netherlands are estimated at 11.8 % of Dutch GDP in
2012 [44], which is around the level in Canada and above
the OECD average. Cost containment is one of the most
important issues in the negotiations between the Dutch
national government, health insurers and healthcare pro-
viders, such as hospitals. In comparing healthcare systems
in Europe on indicators such as patient rights and infor-
mation, accessibility, prevention and outcomes, the annual
Euro health consumer index (EHCI) found in 2014 that
the Netherlands maintained its top position from the past
five years. The Commonwealth Fund also shows that the
Dutch system has generally high scores on performance;
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however, several aspects such as accessibility, prevention,
and the varying quality and costs of healthcare providers
show a clear room for improvement [43].
The position of medical doctors in the Netherlands
Traditionally, medical doctors have a strong position in
the Netherlands. This is due to their high professional
status, but also to relatively low numbers, compared to
many other European countries. For example, Germany
and Denmark have twice as much medical specialists
per 1,000 inhabitants than the Netherlands [51]. Within
healthcare organizations, and in particular hospitals, the
position of medical specialists is distinct from most
other European countries. While nearly all physicians in
hospitals in France, England, Denmark and Germany are
employees; in the Netherlands only 40 % of the approxi-
mately 21,000 medical doctors in hospitals have an em-
ployee status. The other 60 % is entrepreneur and allied
to the hospital with a special management agreement
[51]. In 2012, the Dutch government decided for a rev-
enue ceiling for self-employed doctors, which will be im-
plemented gradually over the next years. Although the
position of medical doctors with an entrepreneurial sta-
tus in the Netherlands is still strong, there are (ongoing)
political pressures for more standardization and integra-
tion of medical doctors in hospital governance.
Initiatives to engage medical doctors in leadership for
healthcare improvements
Over the past decades, there have been main attempts in
the Netherlands to integrate medical specialists in hospital
governance [8, 52]. Already in the 1980s, medical special-
ists were supposed to play a more crucial role by ‘getting
involved in management tasks on a clinical- (organising
care) and organisational-level (hospital as a whole)’ ([8] p.
325). Such initiatives to engage medical doctors in leader-
ship roles beyond immediate patient care were however
accompanied by governmental policies to restrict their in-
dependent status as non-employees and related (higher)
incomes [52]. The initiatives to involve doctors in hospital
management while simultaneously limiting their revenues
led to tensions and barriers between hospital boards and
medical specialists in developing common policies for
healthcare improvements.
In a context of growing concerns about rising health care
expenditures, in the mid-1990s, medical specialists and ex-
ecutive boards of hospitals started to take up joint responsi-
bility for setting up and launching a strategic direction for
the hospital; the so-called Integrated Medical Specialist
Organisation model [52]. In these initiatives, medical spe-
cialists were expected to take more responsibility for organ-
isational tasks and development, ‘which meant that medical
work no longer contained medical activities alone, but con-
sisted of inter-disciplinary managerial activities ([8] p.325).
At the level of the broader healthcare system, major na-
tional healthcare organizations provided joint agreements
for healthcare improvement. For example, the joint Health
Care Sector Organisations (hospitals included) took the ini-
tiative to establish the Care-Wide Governance Code for
good management and supervision [53]. This Governance
Code is accepted and applied by every healthcare organisa-
tion in the Netherlands; it defines among others the re-
sponsibilities of the executive board, having the final
responsibility for managing the healthcare organisation and
its risks, and for ensuring that all medical specialists, either
employees or entrepreneurs, fulfil their responsibilities.
Given increasing pressures for cost containment, and grow-
ing concerns for healthcare quality, the various stakeholders
at different levels in the healthcare system thus took initia-
tives to develop closer ties and common views between
hospital management and medical doctors.
Over time, the theme of governance, quality and safety
received ever more attention in healthcare, with an in-
creasingly prominent role for professionals, such as med-
ical specialists. In 2009, the Council for Public Health and
Care delivered its opinion that healthcare governance can-
not function without professionals being held accountable
for their actions in the report “Governance and Quality of
Care” (2009) [54]. This report was supplemented with an
advisory letter on the “Relationship between the medical
specialist and the hospital in the light of the quality of
care.” (2010) [55]. Other influential organizations also
argued for improving the healthcare system on quality in-
dicators. For example, the Netherlands Court of Audit
produced a critical report on the Evaluation of the Quality
of Care Institutions (2009) stating that quality standards
are insufficiently and should be better monitored [56].
And the Healthcare Inspectorate expressed its critical vi-
sion in the report ‘Beyond permissiveness. Control and
monitoring of quality and safety’ (2009) [57]. These critical
views were incorporated in a new regulatory framework of
the IGZ-Toezichtkader [58] for supervision of healthcare
systems’ quality and safety. The Order of Medical Special-
ists, being the largest professional association of medical
doctors, published a ‘Quality Framework’ (2010) about the
relationship between medical specialists and boards. A
most critical issue in this code of conduct is that medical
specialists and executive boards should work together to
guarantee quality and improving specialist medical care.
We thus perceive a growing emphasis on the necessity for
engaging medical doctors in integrated efforts for improv-
ing the Dutch healthcare system.
In the Netherlands this has resulted in a recent gov-
ernment reform (2015) for a new financial structure and
incentives for collaboration between hospital boards and
medical specialists. From 1 January 2015 onwards, an in-
tegral tariff has been introduced for hospital medical
care and two budgets which were formerly distinct and
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separated are now allied: the budget of the hospital and
the fee budget for medical specialists. The government
reform aims to encourage hospitals and medical specialists
for a more intensive and long term collaboration, to en-
sure that the hospital is sufficiently prepared for the future
in terms of care functions and costs. The government re-
form is meant to stronger unite the goals of hospitals and
(in particular self-employed) medical doctors, to let them
develop jointly the strategy and future of hospital care.
The introduction of bundled payment implies that the
hospitals and medical doctors should discuss together the
hospitals’ policy and have to negotiate the fees of medical
specialists. As a result of the recent reform, the hospitals
and medical doctors are searching for a new model for
management and organization. Until 2015, most self-
employed medical doctors in the Netherlands were orga-
nized in so called partnerships: a group of specialists, who
usually share the same specialty and provide care to a par-
ticular patient group. Given the 2015 government reform,
this partnership form is currently under discussion. Basic-
ally, there are three alternatives [8]. First, the Salaried
Model where the self-employed medical doctors become
employed at the hospital as employees. A second model is
the Cooperation Model, where medical specialists
organize themselves in their own organizations (Medical
Specialist Companies) that can conclude an agreement on
collaboration with the hospital. A third option is the
Participation Model where medical doctors become co-
owners of the hospital. So far, in most hospitals in the
Netherlands, medical doctors have chosen for the second
model and started Medical Specialist Companies (MSCs)
on a cooperative basis. Much attention has been spend
and is still focused on the new structure for management
and organization, which does not necessarily imply in-
creasing engagement of medical doctors in activities be-
yond direct patient care or formal leadership roles.
Facilitative and limiting factors within the Dutch case
Within the broader healthcare system in the Netherlands,
the position of the medical specialist in relation to the
hospital has been developed from coexistence to dialogue
and formal models for integration in the past decades
[59]. Several system reforms, in particular the market-
based reforms with the Health Insurance Law in 2006 and
a new funding system for reimbursing medical treatment
(DTCs), have created a strong mutual dependence be-
tween organizations and professions in the healthcare field
for improving and controlling the quality of care, the vol-
ume (production) and cost/benefit ratios [59]. Mutual de-
pendence between healthcare organizations and medical
doctors is also evident in the internal organization of hos-
pitals wherein hospital units are increasingly headed by a
medical specialist and a manager of business who are to-
gether fully responsible for quality, production, personnel
and finances. The new regulations, financial incentives
and organizational changes are aimed to facilitate health
systems’ progress. They may create the conditions for
medical doctors to become stronger involved in roles for
improvement that go beyond their direct responsibilities
for patient care and collaborating with peers.
Limitations of the initiatives so far seem to be found in
the emphasis on structure, finance and organization rather
than on process, communication, and professional values.
Although the 2015 governmental reform aimed for inte-
grating the medical specialists in hospitals and created a
better basis for a collaborative effort in developing the
hospital strategy and improving healthcare; it seems as if
it does not guarantee more collaboration yet and even
may work out in opposite direction. For example, the new
Medical Specialist Companies have increased the collect-
ive autonomy of self-employed medical doctors, which re-
sult in a stronger position for negotiation with the
hospital boards but does not necessarily lead to more en-
gagement of medical specialists in leadership roles that go
beyond patient care [60]. It seems as if the evaluation of
earlier initiatives [52] is relevant here as well:
“[…] the effectiveness of government policy is rather
limited because of counter strategies of medical
specialists. Led by the self-employed, medical
specialists have opted in favour of a strategy of
collective organisation in hospitals. This strategy is
taking the medical specialists and the hospital in a
different direction from that envisaged by the
government. […] The way in which the integration
has evolved might equally well be designated as
‘separation’ rather than ‘integration’ ([52], p.137).
Overall, the organizational and legal attempts for integra-
tion over the past decades do not yet fit well with the ideas
and interests of medical doctors in the Dutch hospital sys-
tem. A recent evaluation of the new system of bundled pay-
ment since 2015 [60] shows that medical doctors in the
boards of Medical Specialist Companies (MSBs) often per-
ceive more influence on improving the quality of patient
care; but express that in general, medical specialists seem
less engaged: “the involvement of medical specialists can be
improved and their attendance at MSB-meetings is often
limited.” ([60] p.5). A large majority of the hospital boards
in this study is negative about the benefits of the cooper-
ation model. 80 % of the hospital boards in this study per-
ceives the new system as “a costly and time-consuming
exercise, while the changes in daily practice have little or no
positive impact on patient care” ([60] p.5). Engagement of
medical doctors in leadership roles for and beyond direct
patient care may require additional initiatives that are closer
to their professional values and interests, to let them be-
come engaged in collaborative efforts for more quality and
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safety and create better cost containment. Governmental
and organizational policies with an overly focus on top
down performance indicators and competition seem to
turn out counterproductive.
Discussion: lessons from the two healthcare
systems
Medical professions have been historically influential in
shaping the healthcare systems and the delivery of care
[52]. Of course, the degree of autonomy and the influence
exerted by the medical profession may vary across various
systems and jurisdictions, but it is widely recognized now
that medical leadership and engagement in roles that go
beyond individual doctor excellence is an important asset
for the performance and the future of healthcare system
[61, 62]. Most health care systems, in a more or less expli-
cit way, address through reforms or policies the challenge
of engaging medical doctors and developing their leader-
ship for health systems improvement [63].
In this paper, based on two jurisdictions, we have ana-
lysed the strategies used to mobilize and convert the ex-
pertise, ability to influence and legitimacy of the medical
profession in an asset to transform and improve health
systems. We depart from works in the field of hybridity
and medical managers by taking a system approach to
the emergence of these roles and attempt to elucidate
some of the policy challenges and opportunities to
achieve broader engagement of medical doctors in
health system reforms and improvement. One of the
fundamental policy challenges with regard to the role of
the medical profession in the evolution of contemporary
healthcare systems is the capacity to create an inter-
mediate space in these systems [64] to mediate and ac-
commodate potentially conflicting forces or pressures to
develop transformative and improvement capacities.
This implies that governments and healthcare organiza-
tions have to search for strategies to locate clinical/med-
ical practice at a more collective level and also to install
medical leadership and engagement in so-called less
structured systems like networks [65].
To address these challenges faced by mature healthcare
systems [39], governments have promulgated policy
changes that appear both in Canada and the Netherlands as
a combination of top-down policy guidance with bottom-
up and joint initiatives between medical bodies and govern-
ments. Health systems in Canadian provinces are structur-
ally more centralized than the Dutch healthcare system and
less players are involved in their regulation. For health sys-
tems in Canada, the main challenge with regard to medical
engagement and leadership is to promote collaborative and
large-scale improvement initiatives that can provide an
arena that is sufficiently distinct and attractive to mobilize
the medical profession, and to escape from the constraints
and somewhat conflicting tone of the labour regime and
the fundamental social contract between the State and the
profession. While joint work carries a more voluntary tone,
we observed that any serious and enduring medical engage-
ment and leadership development strategy will require
some innovative policy for physician compensation and
performance management, to take into account the time
that physicians are dedicated to extra-clinical roles and to
move from local initiatives to broader changes in the sys-
tem. In addition, the capacity to compensate physicians for
leadership development activities, such as training, appears
important. Such an innovative policy coupled with capacity
development is required to transcend current structural
limits of the system.
In the Dutch case, government policies have evolved to-
ward a more market-like model that on the one hand
seems to confirm the desire of the medical profession for
maintaining a high degree of autonomy, but on the other
restricts this autonomy due to limitations set by private
health insurance companies and financial policy conditions.
One of the challenge of the Dutch system, somewhat simi-
lar to the Canadian case, is to channel the variety of initia-
tives within a coherent and global regulatory framework.
As observed, a majority of physicians choose for a model of
practice (the Medical Specialist Company) that affirms their
status of quasi-autonomous entrepreneurs in the system.
As in Canada, there is a constant tension between the de-
sire to nurture professional entrepreneurship (and auton-
omy) in the system and the need to better connect medical
practice to broader organizational and system goals. In the
Dutch case, with a very different policy background and a
much more plural healthcare system, the situation of the
medical profession in terms of autonomy and ability to pro-
tect itself from engagement and leadership in extra clinical
roles appears basically similar to the Canadian cases.
The challenge for the health system in the Netherlands is
therewith also somewhat similar to the one found in the
Canadian cases, to promote collaborative and large-scale
initiatives that are able to mobilize the medical profession
for healthcare improvements beyond a single focus on
efficiency and cost containment. For both jurisdictions, the
development of medical leadership for health system im-
provement in various capacities (formal senior executive
positions, leaders of improvement initiatives etcetera)
seems a pre-requisite to support the wide engagement of
the profession in improving the system [62]. However, this
is not easy to achieve. An empirical study of medical doc-
tors by Kurunmäki [19] shows that in the health system in
Finland considerations for cost management are incorpo-
rated in medical practice, blending clinical expertise with
accounting principles. The expansion of a process of
hybridization to generate large-scale quality improve-
ment appears a persisting challenge, despite earlier
initiatives in that direction in the two systems that
we analyzed.
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Overall, based on a comparison of the two jurisdic-
tions, Canada and the Netherlands, it appears that broad
health system’s differences leave open the question how
the autonomy and expertise of the medical profession
can become a driver of large-scale improvement. In both
cases, specific initiatives at the level of the healthcare
systems have to be developed to support the involve-
ment of medical doctors in health system improvement.
Laissez-faire in this regard will probably provide only
small scale and local improvement initiatives in which
the role of the medical profession in terms of leadership
and engagement is underdeveloped. The development of
broader clinical engagement and leadership for health
system improvement requires deliberate policy initiatives
that can engage the medical profession and governments
in some form of joint or collaborative policy-making
[66]. Regulatory approaches without such engagement
and medical leadership appear insufficient for real
healthcare improvement.
Conclusion
Our paper dealt with the relation between the health
system context and the opportunities and constraints for
medical doctors to engage in health system improve-
ment, and provide leadership beyond their traditional,
though still extremely relevant and demanding, role of
care for patients. In this article, we have used illustra-
tions of policy initiatives in two jurisdictions that aimed
to influence the role of the medical profession in achiev-
ing broad health system improvement goals. While indi-
vidual clinicians can be fully motivated and engaged in
delivering the best care, they seem to depend on a sup-
portive environment to achieve high standards of prac-
tice and to use resources wisely [3]. The medical
profession plays a key role in developing such environ-
ment. The status of the medical profession makes them
a unique case in the healthcare system when it is time to
foster a more collective view on professional practice.
The embeddedness of the medical profession within a
highly institutionalized context (labour regimes, trad-
ition of autonomy and arms-length relationship with
government and management) obliges policy-makers
and the professionals to elaborate strategies and initia-
tives to compensate the limitations imposed by current
institutional rules and discipline [67].
We suggest through this analysis that the use of regula-
tory constraints is not sufficient to create a durable mo-
mentum within the medical profession in order to
transcend current limitations. Joint and collaborative policy
initiatives that pay serious attention to capacity develop-
ment and policy coherence can be a promising venue.
Capacity development and collaborative work around im-
provement were discussed in the context of the Canadian
cases as an alternative approach to support the involvement
of medical doctors in broader organizational and health
system goals. In this analysis, strong policy-drive and incen-
tives reveal to be essential components to stimulate inter-
ests in joint work at a sufficient scale. In the Dutch case,
the use of financial incentives to let the executive board
and the medical doctors in hospitals agree on common
goals has been predominant. Both countries can learn from
these different approaches to better align improvement in
capacity development with a proper payment structure. Dif-
ferent institutional contexts, such as a more unitary system
like the one found in Canadian provinces and territories
and a more pluralist one like the Netherlands, have differ-
ent policy experiences but seem to face similar policy
challenges. Achieving alignment between soft (trust, col-
laboration) and hard (financial incentives) levers may re-
quire facilitative conditions at the level of the health
system, like clarity and stability of broad policy orienta-
tions and openness to local experimentation [68]. Such
policy work will acknowledge the limits of initiatives that
overinvest in structural arrangements to engage the med-
ical profession (including financial incentives) and develop
its leadership.
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